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RECENT CASES
:
ment procedure was held valid subsequent to legislation 'o
extending the
scope of the writ of habeas corpus to include not only the question of wrongful confinement, but also the determination of the question of insanity. t
In Rhode Island, temporary confiinement without hearing in a non-emergency
case has been held justified on the ground that the nature of the action always
calls for emergency procedure.2

The conflict seems to arise from the divergent interpetations of the concept
of due process, while the importance of the issue stems from the fear of
unjust confinement.:; Nevertheless, the fact of insanity is largely if not
completely a matter of scientific diagnosis,34 and where a finding of insanity
is attested to by qualified physicians,35 the presence or absence of judicial
approval would seem to be of little significance. Though there exists the
possibility of fraudulent confinement in case of dishonesty of the two
attesting physicians, determination of insanity by an appointed body of
qualified psychiatrists would leave little room for serious concern. 3G
It would be unwise to construe due process to mean the strict application
of notice and hearing. No hard and fast rule can be laid down.-, The
welfare of the mentally ill is an all important consideration, and their treatment would seem to call for special procedure consistent with the necessities
of their unfortunate malady.
WILLIAM11 C.

INSURANCE -

LIABILITY INSURANCE

-

INJURY ARISING

KELSCH

OUT OF UNLOADING

Plaintiff had insured its delivery truck with defendant. The policy
covered damages for bodily injury caused by accidents arising out of the
ownership, maintenance or use of the truck. The "use" of the vehicle included the "loading and unloading" thereof. In the course of its business
plaintiff delivered a roll of linoleum to a customer. Plaintiff's employee
removed the linoleum from the truck and with the help of another lifted
the roll to the porch of the customer's home. Later the same day, because
of the negligence of plaintiff's employee in placing the linoleum on the porch,
the linoleum fell on the customer's daughter causing serious injury.
Held, the injury was within the provisions of the policy because it arose out
VEHICLE -

30. R.I. Laws 1896, c. 82 § 19. It should be noted that North Dakota has extended
the application of the writ of habeas corpus to include determination of the question of
insanity. N.D. Rev. Code 25-0328 (1943).
31. In re Crosswell, 28 R.I. 137, 66 Atl. 55 (1907).
32. Cf. id. at 58.
33. Note, 56 Yale L.J. 1178 at 1182 (1947).
34. Curran, supra note 9 at 283; Note 3, Stan. L. Rev. 109 at 110 (1950).
35. In most jurisdictions physicians licensed in general practice are considered qualified experts on insanity. Glover v. State, 129 Ga. 717, 59 S.E. 816 (1907); Holt v.
State, 840 Okla. Crim. 283, 181 P.2d. 573 (1947); Brody v. State, 116 Tex. Crim.
427, 34 SW.2d 587 (1931). However, from within the field of medicine itself comes
strong criticism of this majority rule. The expert psychiatrist considers this unrealistic
in view of the inadequate training of the general practitioner in the field of psychiatry
or in the lack of interest in the subject of mental disorder. See Overholsen, Psychiatric
Expert Testimony in Criminal Cases Since McNaghten-A Review, 42 J. Crim. & Criminology 283, 295 (1951). On the other hand it has been held that the trial judge can
exclude a general practitioner as an expert unless he qualifies by having either special
knowledge or special study in the field of mental illness. McElroy v. State, 146 Tenn.
442, 242 S.W. 883 (1922).
36. An administrative board of qualified psychiatrists as proposed for the State of
California, outlined in Note, 3 Stan. L. Rev. 109 (1950).
37. See Brock v North Carolina, 344 U.S. 428, 427-428 (1953).

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
of the unloading of the truck. Raffel v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 106 A.2d 716
Conn. 1954).
In an effort to reach a fair result in determining when unloading begins
and ends the courts have applied either the "coming to rest" doctrine or
the "complete operation" doctrine. According to the former, unloading
comprises only the actual removing (or lifting) of the article from the motor
vehicle up to the moment when the goods removed have actually come to
xest. 1 Under the complete operation doctrine, unloading includes the entire
process involved in the movement of goods from the moment when they
are given into the insured's possession until they are turned over at the
place of destination to the party to whom delivery is to be made.2 The
"
former theory distinguishes between unloading and delivery while the latter
claims the unloading is one continuous operation; that is, the unloading
includes the dilevery.4 A recent case stated that coverage under the complete
operation theory includes any act done by insured's employee which proximately causes the accident arising out of the use of the insured's automobile.The decision in the instant case is not inconsistent with the complete operation
doctrine which the Connecticut court has apparently adopted. The unloading was still taking place when the plaintiff's employee set the linoleum on the
customer's porch, and it was through the negligence of this employee that the
linoleum later fell on the injured girl. The cause of the accident was the result of
the unloading of the truck. If the peril insured against is the efficient,
predominating cause of the loss, it is regarded as the proximate cause. 6 n
a number of past cases the injury occurred during the controversial unloading,7 while in the instant case the injury occurred after the unloading
had been completed. However the injury did arise out of the unloading.
8
Two other courts have followed the same line of reasoning.
The term "unloading" must be taken in its plain and ordinary sense. 9
No definite rule can be set down as to what unloading should include, but
but each case must be treated separately according to the facts involved.10
The policy in the instant case does not define "unloading" and because of
its apparent ambiguity, it should be construed most favorably toward the
plaintiff."
The insurance policy involved covers injuries arising out of
1. See Pacific Auto Ins. Co. v. Commercial Cas. Ins. of New York, 108 Utah 500, 161

P.2d 423, 424 (1945).
2. See id, 161 P.2d at 425.
3. See St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Standard Ace. Ins. Co., 216 Minn. 193,
11 N.W.2d 794, 796 (1943); American Oil and Supply Co. v. United States Cas. Co.,

19 N.J. Misc 7, 18 A.2d 257, 259 (1940).
4. See State ex rel. Butte Brewing Co. v. Dist. Ct. For Silver Bow County, 110 Mont.

250, 100 P.2d 932, 934 (1940).
5.

See Red Ball Motor Freight Inc. v. Employers Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 189 F.2d

374, 377 (5th Cir. 1951).
6. Maness v. Life and Cas. Ins. Co., of Tenn., 161 Tenn. 41, 28 S.W.2d 339 (1930).
7. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cassety, 119 F.2d 602 (6th Cir. 1941); B & D Motor
Lines Inc. v. Citizens Cas. Co. of New York, 181 Misc. 985, 43 N.Y.S.2d 486 (1943);
Pacific Auto Ins. Co. v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. of New York, supra note 1; London
Guarantee and Ace. Co. v. C. B. White and Brothers Inc., 188 Va. 195, 49 S.E.2d
254 (1948).
8. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Dalton Coal and Material Co., 184 F.2d 181 (8th Cir. 1950);
Schmidt v. Utilities Ins. Co., 353 Mo. 213, 182 S.W.2d 181 (1944).
9. See United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Church, 107 F. Supp. 683, 687
(N.D. Cal. 1952).
10. See American Oil and Supply Co. v. United States Cas. Co., 19 N.J. Misc. 7,
18 A.2d 257, 259 (1940).
11. See Bobier v. National Cas. Co., 143 Ohio St. 215, 54 N.E.2d 798, 801 (1944).
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ownership, maintenance or use of the vehicle, and the term "use" includes
the loading and unloading thereof. The words "arising out of" seem to have
a broad significance. One could understand it to mean originating from,
having its origin in, growing out of or flowing from, incident to or having
connection with the use of the vehicle.13 In the instant case the accident
clearly flowed from or grew out of the unloading.
The adoption of the complete operation theory appears to be the more
1
modern view, 3 and where the liability policy does not define unloading
it would seem that this theory would more effectively implement the intent
14
of the parties.
North Dakota has not had to deal with the problem, but Minnesota 15
1
and Wisconsin 6 are among the states 1T which have adopted the more
limited 18 coming to rest doctrine. Montana 19 follows the view which appears
"
to be that the majority of courts in accepting the complete operation doctrine. 1
KENNETH YRI
JUDGMENT -

DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS -

NECESSITY OF A JUSTICIABLE CON-

- The action involed a petition for declaratory judgment of the
validity of a city zoning ordinance, which prohibits the plaintiff from erecting
signs on the roofs of its buildings. In an impending eminent domain proceeding, an electric company sought to condemn a right of way to string wires over
the plaintiff's buildings. The amount of compensation due plaintiff from the
electric company was dependent upon the validity of the ordinance, since the
space above the buildings had value only for the display of signs, and the
electric company agreed to delay its proceeding pending the declaratory judgment. It was held, on appeal, that there was no justiciable controversy between
plaintiff and city. Mayor, etc. of Savannah v. Bay Realty Co., 82 S.E.2d 710,
(Ga. 1954).
It is well settled that the existence of a justiciable controversy is essential
TROVERSY.

12. See Schmidt v .Utilities Ins. Co., 353 Mo. 213, 182 S.W.2d 181, 184 (1944).
13. See Maryland Cas. Co. v. Dalton Coal and Material Co., supra note 8; Red Ball
Motor Freight inc. v. Employers Mut. Liability Ins. Co. of Wisconsin, supra note 5;
Schmidt v. Utilities Ins. Co., supra note 8; Pacific Auto Ins. Co. v. Commercial Cas. Ins.
Co. of New York, supra note 1.
14. See Turtlelaub v. Hardwars Mut. Cas. Co., 26 N.J. Misc. 316, 62 A.2d 830, 834
(1948).
15. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Standard Ace. Ins. Co., supra note 3. (Goods
were taken off insured truck and put on sidewalk. The injury occurred when they were
put on hand trucks and moved into a building. Held, the unloading process terminated
when goods were removed from the truck and placed on the sidewalk). Contra: B & D.
Motor Lines Inc. v. Citizens Cas. Co. of New York, 181 Misc. 985, 43 N.Y.S.2d 486
(1943).
(The insured
16. Stammer v. Kitzmiller, 226 Wisc. 348, 276 N.W. 629 (1937)
truck was used to deliver beer. Driver removed a cover from the manhole in the sidewalk and placed the beer keg on 'the sidewalk and later placed the keg through the
hatchway. While driver was inside making out a sales slip plaintiff fell into the hatchway. Court held that the unloading process had been completed when the beer keg was
placed on the sidewalk.)
17. Ferry .v Protective Indemnity Co., 155 Pa. Super. 266, 38 A.2d 493 (1944);
American Cas. Co. v. Fisher, 195 Ga. 136, 23 S.E.2d 395 (1942).
18. See Red Ball Motor Freight Inc. v. Employers Mut. Liability Ins. Co. of Wisconsin, supra note 6 at 377.
19. State ex rel Butte Brewing Co. v. Dist. Ct. for Silver Bow County, supra note 4.
(Beer was lowered from the truck to the sidewalk. Employee theen went into establishnent and was raising a door from the sidewalk when a person stepped on the door and
was injured. Court held that the unloading of the beer was a continuous operation from
the time the truck came to a stop until the beer was delivered to its destination.)
L
20. See note 8 supra.

